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Public Law and Private Law : The Frontier 
from the Perspective off a Tort Lawyer 
Allen M. LINDEN* 
I 
Introduction 
A thousand years ago there was virtually no dichotomy between 
public law and private law in our legal culture. If a person wrongfully 
injured or killed another, he was required to pay money to that other 
person or to his family as compensation. The underlying purpose of 
this system was the appeasement of the clan of the victim in order to 
reduce their desire to take physical revenge.' 
Eventually, the public law intruded into this essentially private 
system of dispute resolution, when the King required certain wrong-
doers to pay him some money. In the thirteenth century, the "public" 
prosecution of serious wrongdoers became the primary technique of 
violence control, when wrongdoers were prohibited from buying their 
freedom by paying off the clans of their victims.2 This did not mean, 
however, that a private action could not be taken by the victim in 
addition to the public prosecution ; it only meant that public prosecu-
tion could not be avoided merely by paying compensation. This is still 
the law of Canada.3 
For the last seven hundred years, therefore, public law has 
interfered with the resolution of disputes between private citizens. 
Indeed, the role of public law has steadily expanded, at the expense of 
private law, to the point where it now so dominates our daily life that 
the Law Reform Commission of Canada has concluded that we must 
begin to decriminalize our society by diversion and other similar 
techniques.4 
* Q.C., Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School, Toronto, Canada. 
1. See MALONE, "Ruminations on the Role of Fault in the History of the Common Law of 
Torts", (1970) 31 La. L. Rev. 1. 
2. See Criminal Code, R.S.C., c. 34, s. 129; Jeffery, "The Development of Crime in Early 
English Society", in Crime and the Legal Process, ,9696 
3. Criminal Code, ss .0. 
4. L.R.C.C., Working Paper 7, Diversion (1975)) 
(1976) 17 Carriera deOro/t 831 
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In recent years, however, public and private law are once again 
beginning to lose their distinctiveness. Many of the notions historically 
employed in resolving private disputes are now being used in public 
law disputes. On the other hand, private law is adopting certain public 
law tools, such as legislation, to resolve private disputes. Moreover, 
entire areas that were formerly in the realm of private disputes, such 
as workman's compensation, are being taken over by public law 
institutions. Indeed, it has become almost impossible to distinguish 
the current task of public law from that of private law, for there has 
been a considerable blurring of their functions. In many situations, an 
aggrieved victim has the choice of pursuing a public remedy or a 
private remedy, and often he may even press for both remedies. 
This paper is a preliminary foray in the frontier area where public 
and private law intersect. My assignment was to focus on certain 
aspects of tort law, how it has affected and how it has been affected by 
public law, primarily penal law. I am all too conscious of the fact that 
I am only scratching on the surface of the issues raised, but we must 
begin somewhere. 
II 
Distinction between Public and Private Law 
It is no easy matter to define with any precision the difference 
between public and private law. It would be overly facile to observe 
that public law is meant to include such fields as criminal, administra-
tive and constitutional law, whereas private law encompasses such 
areas as tort, contract, restitution and property law. Such a categori-
zation is incomplete, because public and private law cannot be so 
easily dichotomized. They are not separate, watertight compartments ; 
rather, public and private law often overlap and infiltrate one 
another's territory. The truth is that the distinctions between public 
and private law are not as sharp as might be supposed. 
Let us, nevertheless, consider three of the alleged distinctions 
between public and private law to see whether any workable guidelines 
can be discerned. 
1. Aims 
One of the differences between public and private law is said to be 
that public law aims to protect the public interest whereas private law 
seeks to protect only private interests. The great Blackstone, for 
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example, observed that crimes infringed public rights, while torts 
invaded only civil or private rights. Crimes, he contended, affected the 
"whole community", striking at the "very being of society", whereas 
civil injuries were "immaterial to the public".5 
It is now pretty well agreed that Blackstone's distinction oversta-
ted the case, for tort law is not concerned only with the private 
interests; it also serves the public interest. Tort law, just like the 
criminal law, seeks to deter socially undesirable conduct. Tortious 
conduct, in the same way as criminal conduct, may interfere with the 
public interest and should, therefore, be discouraged by sanctions. 
This notion was once dramatized by the words of Lord Devlin, when 
he proclaimed that "it is necessary to teach a wrongdoer that tort does 
not pay."6 
Indeed, almost all criminal conduct can attract tort liability as 
well as state punishment. A criminal assault or rape invariably 
amounts to a civil assault or battery as well.7 Conduct that would 
render someone guilty of theft or fraud in the criminal courts is always 
tortious as well. The same kinds of social concerns that have led to the 
creation of criminal liability for these acts have also generated tort 
responsibility for them. 
Leon Green has eloquently pointed out that tort law is very much 
"public law in disguise"8 because it takes into account the public 
interest in the resolution of private disputes. John Austin was of the 
same opinion and has asserted that, "all offences affect the commu-
nity, and all offences affect individuals". He also argued that "the 
difference between civil injuries and crimes can hardly be found in any 
difference between the ends or purposes of the corresponding sanc-
tions".'' Consequently, although as a matter of emphasis, criminal law 
may be somewhat more concerned with the public interest than is 
private law, private law also takes very much into consideration the 
public interest. 
5. Commentaries, Book 3, p. 2; Book 4, p. 5; Hall, "Interrelations of Criminal Law and 
Torts", (1943) 43 Colum. L. Rev. 753, at p. 757. 
6. Rookes v. Barnard, [1964] A.C. 1129, at p. 1227. 
7. See, generally: Linden, "Victims of Crime and Tort Law", (1969) 12 Can. Bar J. 17. 
8. Green, "Tort Law Public Law in Disguise", (1960) 38 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 251. See also Blum 
and Kalven, "Public Law Perspectives on a Private Law Problem — Auto Compensation 
Plans", (1964) 31 U. Chi. L. Rev. 641. 
9. Lectures on Jurisprudence, 4a Ed., 1879, at p. 417 and at p. 520; see also Holmes, The 
Common Law, 1881, at p. 35. 
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2. Sanctions 
A second difference between public and private law is supposed to 
lie in the type of sanctions that are administered to offenders. Penal 
sanctions are more severe and varied than civil ones. The sanctions 
exacted for criminal activity include fines, imprisonment and, until 
recently, flogging or death. For tortious conduct, on the other hand, 
the sanction is usually the payment of damages by the defendant to the 
plaintiff,10 although other remedies like injunctions are sometimes 
granted. 
This is certainly one important distinction between public and 
private law, but even the differences between the sanctions, on closer 
scrutiny, tend to blur. Nowadays, the range of criminal sanctions 
includes some that possess the attributes of civil sanctions and some 
that are barely sanctions at all. For example, a Canadian criminal 
court may order restitution " and even compensation.12 Moreover, the 
criminal sanction of absolute or conditional dischargel3 can often be 
less severe than the civil one that might be imposed for the same 
conduct. It is a very common occurrence today that the fine imposed 
for a highway traffic offence is less in amount than the damages 
awarded against the same driver, if he is sued civilly for an accident 
that results from the offending conduct. 
One novel development in modern penal legislation is the 
granting of civil remedies to the victims of criminal conduct. For 
example, recent amendments to the Criminal Code, seeking to 
protect privacy, provide not only for ordinary penal sanctions against 
offenders, but also for the payment by the accused to the person 
aggrieved an amount not exceeding $5000 as punitive damages.14 
Other examples of civil remedies being granted for criminal or quasi-
criminal activity abound.15 
Moreover, private law litigation can lead to public law sanctions 
being ultimately imposed. Someone who refuses to abide by the 
judgment of a civil court, for example, may be found guilty of 
10. Blackstone, Commentaries, Book 44 ,a t. 66 ;almond, The Law of Torts, 16* Ed., 1973, at 
p. 8; Winfield and Jolowicz, On Tort, 9* Ed., 1971, at p. 14. 
11. Criminal Code, ss. 616, 666 (2) (e)e 
12. Criminal Code, ss. 654, 655. 
13. Criminal Code, s. 662.1. 
14. Criminal Code, s. 178.21. 
15. Trade Marks Act, see MacDonald v. Vapor Canada (Jan. 30, 1196, S.C.C.)) Liquor 
Licence Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 250, s. 68; U.S. Sherman Act, treble eamages, etc. 
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contempt and punished criminally.16 So, too, a defendant in a motor 
vehicle collision, who fails to pay a civil judgment awarded against 
him, may have his driver's licence revoked, at least until he arranges to 
pay the award." 
Private law suits can still yield substantial punitive damage 
awards in Canadian courts, despite a marked retreat from this area by 
the English courts.18 Here, the court, in a civil action, expressly seeks 
to punish the defendant for his flagrant conduct. The sanction may 
still be civil, in the sense that money is paid by the defendant to the 
plaintiff, but it is clearly penal in purpose. This is manifested by the 
fact that civil courts take into account any criminal penalty that has 
been imposed, as a mitigating circumstance, prior to assessing the 
amount of punitive damages.19 
The sanctions in public law, therefore, may be broader and more 
severe than they are in private law, but the differences are often less 
than might be imagined at first blush. 
3. Parties 
In public law litigation, the party that triggers the proceeding and 
generally carries it to its .conclusion is the state or one of its agencies. 
In private law, the activating party is usually an aggrieved individual 
or corporation, called the plaintiff. This plaintiff has control over the 
pace of the proceeding, decides whether to settle or to press on to 
judgment, and chooses whether or not and how to enforce a judgment, 
if one is obtained. 
But here, too, private disputes may take on public attributes and 
vice versa. For example, a private commercial dispute for deceit or 
fraudulent misrepresentation, can be transformed into a penal prose-
cution for fraud if an aggrieved party notifies the police about the 
defendant's conduct. In certain situations, as in public nuisance, 
private complaints can only be proceeded with by the Attorney-
General on behalf of all the aggrieved individuals.20 
Public law, however, can also be affected by private parties. 
Certain procedures now exist whereby citizens may appear before 
16. Re Shepherd v. Shepherd(\976), 10 O.R. (2d) 19: $500 fine imposed. 
17. Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Act, R.R.S. 1970, c. 281, s. 5(6). 
18. See Fridman, "Punitive Damages in Tort", (1970)48 Can. Bar Rev. 3737 
19. Amos v. Vawter (\969), 6 D.L.R. (3d) 234. 
20. See, generally : McLaren, "The Common Law Nuisance Actions and the Environmental 
Battle", (1972) 10 O.H.LJ. 505 ; Estey, ,Public Nuiiancc end Standing tt oue", (1972) )1 
O.H.LJ. 563. 
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boards and even the Supreme Court of Canada to present evidence 
and argument as to the public interest or as to their own collective 
private interests.21 Moreover, in a criminal case, the fact that the 
aggrieved person does not want to press charges, or wants to withdraw 
charges already laid, has a considerable influence (though certainly 
not a decisive one) on whether the prosecution proceeds to charge or 
try a wrongdoer. 
Another strange proceeding that is permitted under Canadian 
criminal law is a private criminal prosecution that may be pursued by 
an individual without the aid of the Crown prosecutor. Here, a private 
citizen may lay an information and conduct an entire criminal 
prosecution on behalf of the public. The Attorney-General is able, in 
most cases, to take over such a prosecution, but rarely does so.22 
Procedure may also distinguish public law from private law, but 
that is too lengthy and peripheral to my purpose for me to consider it 
in this paper.23 
In sum, therefore, the differences between public and private law 
are perhaps more imagined than real. There is much overlapping and 
blurring of functions. Public law is said to be more concerned with the 
public interest than with private concerns, but private law is also 
devoted to serving the public interest. Public law is alleged to involve 
more serious sanctions, but civil sanctions may sometimes be more 
severe than criminal ones. Public law is more the preserve of officials 
than of private citizens, but private citizens can also participate in 
public law litigation. The differences between public law and private 
law, it may be suggested, are less dramatic than is sometimes realized ; 
they are differences of degree, rather than of quality. 
Let us now examine a few torts areas where public law has 
infiltrated private law's domain. 
Ill 
Public Law's Infiltration of Private Law 
The invasion of private law by public law is nothing new. In the 
past, this has generally occurred when the private law approach 
proved inadequate to the task of controlling certain types of activities or 
21. See, generally: Emond, "Participation and the Environment: A Strategy for Democrati-
zing Canada's Environmental Protection Laws", (1975) 13 O.H.LJ. 783. 
22. See Burns, "Private Prosecutions in Canada: The Law and a Proposal for Change", (1975) 
21 McGUlLJ. 267. 
23. See, generally : Williams, "The Definition of a Crime", (1955) 8 Current Legat Prob. 107. 
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of providing adequate compensation for the victims of anti-social 
conduct. Public law has been employed to buttress up private law 
controls when it becomes apparent that they have failed to perform 
acceptably. Thus, the development of public criminal law was largely 
in response to the inability of the private system of payments to keep 
the peace. More recently, the establishment of governmental work-
men's compensation schemes, early in this century, was a reaction to 
the incapacity of the tort system to resolve satisfactorily the problems 
associated with worker injuries. The unholy trinity of common law 
defences — contributory negligence, voluntary assumption of risk and 
the fellow employment rule — made it virtually impossible for a 
workman to recover tort damages from his employer, even where the 
latter was negligent. The situation demanded reform and a public law 
compensation scheme was created. Another large field, that of labour 
relations, was largely removed from the aegis of private law, in part 
because the type of regulation furnished by private law proved too 
oppressive for the community at large. In still more recent times, the 
inadequacy of tort and contract remedies in the field of consumer 
protection has led to a whole series of new public law initiatives in this 
field." 
Another public law scheme, established to mollify the failings of 
tort law, was the plan to compensate victims of crime. In the late '60's, 
it became apparent that, although, in theory, victims of violent crime 
could sue their assailants in tort, in practice, less than 2 percent were 
ever successful in securing any tort recovery.25 The provinces began to 
establish public schemes whereby these victims could secure compen-
sation from the public treasury, instead of being required to sue their 
attackers. The various Boards were given the right to sue the 
attackers, by subrogation, on behalf of those who were paid repara-
tion.26 
The debate over auto insurance reform is in this tradition of 
public law being invoked to repair the private law. Those advocating 
the replacement of tort law by a universal accident compensation 
scheme27 are doing so because they have concluded that tort law has 
24. For example. Food and Drugs Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. F-27 ; Hazardous Products Act, R.S.C. 
1970, c. H-3; Motor Vehicle Safety Actt R.S.C. .970, ,c .6 ((« Supp.). 
25. Linden, Osgoode HallStudy on Compensation for Victims of Crime, 1968. 
26. See, generally : Burns and Ross, "A Comparative Study of Victims of Crime Indemnifica-
tion in Canada", (1973) 8 U.B.C.L. Rev. 105. 
27. Ison, The Forensic cottery, 1967 ; Atiyah, Accidents, Compensation and the Law, 2" E2., 
1975. 
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failed to compensate fairly and quickly the hordes of victims of auto 
accidents and that a complete public law scheme is required to remedy 
the situation. 
These examples are well known, and are not worth more than a 
cursory mention. What I want to dwell on for a little longer, however, 
are a few of the more subtle incursions of public law into the area of 
private law. These more indirect influences are not as well recognised 
or well understood. 
1. Violation of Criminal Statutes 
a) Negligent Conduct and Penal Law 
One of the most important areas where public law has infiltrated 
tort law is in the civil courts' treatment of penal violations. When it 
appears, in a negligence case, that the defendant has infringed a 
criminal statute, the court usually feels that it must consider whether 
that fact is relevant to the resolution of the civil dispute. In doing so, 
the court usually insists on examining the statute to determine its 
intention with regard to conferring a civil cause of action.28 
Now, if there is an express intention included in the statute, or 
even if one can fairly imply such an intention from the context, this is 
sensible enough. However, in the vast majority of situations, there is 
really no evidence in the legislation of what the intention of the 
legislature is on this matter. The court, therefore, is on its own — it 
may decide to rely on the evidence of breach or it may ignore it, 
depending on whether it feels that its use would be helpful. 
Although rarely expressed to be such by the judiciary, this 
decision is primarily one of policy, not of discovering an illusory 
intention.29 One reason for using the legislative standards, particularly 
in highway and safety matters, is that the courts can crystallize the 
otherwise overly vague standard of the reasonable person. Some 
courts, reluctant to let the jury decide every case afresh, (even where 
the defendant has breached some statutory provision) use legislation 
to particularize and to give guidance to the jury. Another policy 
rationale is the desire for consistency between public and private law. 
It would look very strange indeed, if someone were found guilty in a 
28. Cunnigham v. Moore, [1972] 3 O.R. 269, afTd [1973] 1 O.R. 358 ; Maclsaac v. Beretanos 
(1972), 25 D.L.R. (3d) 610; Henzel v. Brussels Motors Ltd. (1972), 31 D.L.R. (3d) 131. 
29. See Alexander, "Legislation and the Standard of Care of Negligence", (1964)42 Can. Bar 
Rev. 243 ; Linden, "Tort Liability for Criminal Nonfeasance", ( 1966) 44 Can. Bar Rev. 25. 
LINDEN Public Law and Prrvate Law 839 
criminal prosecution for the violation of some statute, and then was 
relieved of civil responsibility for the same conduct. Tort and criminal 
liability should correspond, if possible. Another purpose of using 
penal statutes in tort cases is to buttress the deterrent force of the 
criminal law. In addition to whatever penal sanctions are imposed on 
the offender, tort sanctions may also be exacted, thus rendering the 
wrongdoer doubly responsible both to the state and to the individual. 
Here, tort law is operating as the partner of the criminal law, 
strengthening whatever prophylactic power it exerts over the public. 
Public law is being wisely used here, despite confusion surrounding 
where and how it will be invoked. 
The fact of a statutory violation is not even relevant in a civil 
case, however, unless (1) it is aimed at preventing the kind of accident 
that has occurred ; (2) it is meant to protect the claimant, and (3) the 
offending conduct caused the accident complained of. 
In most situations, where the legislation is felt to be relevant, it is 
now clear that evidence of a breach of a criminal statute is treated in a 
civil case as prima facie evidence of negligence.30 What was meant by 
this phrase is not crystal clear, however. The best explication of the 
procedural effect accorded a breach of statute derives from Queens-
way Tank Lines Ltd. v. Moise,31 where Mr. Justice MacKay of the 
Ontario Court of Appeal observed as follows : 
If the person failed to have his car equipped or operating in accordance 
with the Act or regulations, or contravened any of the rules of the road, 
and such conduct was shown to be a cause of the accident, it would, as 
Cartwright J., as he then was, said in the Sterling Trust case, be prima 
facie evidence of negligence and unless he could show by the evidence that 
the failure of his equipment or breach of the traffic rules occurred through 
no fault or want of care on his part, he would be liable. 
On the basis of this decision, it is clear, at least until otherwise held by 
the Supreme Court, that a defendant who has violated a highway 
traffic statute bears the onus of disproving that he was negligent. If he 
fails to do so, then a plaintiff who relies upon the violation of the 
statute is entitled to recover.32 
30. See Sterling Trusts Corporation v. Postma and Little, [1965] S.C.R. 324; see also 
Alexander, "The Fate of Sterling Trusts Corporation v. Postma", (1961) 2 Ottawa L. Rev. 
441. See generally, Linden, Canadian Negligence Law, 1912, chapter 4. 
31. [1970] 1 O.R. 535. 
32. See also Blakney v. Le Blanc cetl. (1971), ,1 D.L.R. (3d) )80 (N.B.C.A.); Jordan n. 
Coleman ((976)) 57 D.L.R. .3d) )56 (S.C.C.) ; ;agnon v. La Reine, [1970] Ex. CR. 716, at 
p. 736 (No81 J) : "presumptton". 
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There is another group of situations, not dealing with highway 
traffic legislation, however, where it appears that evidence of a 
violation of statute is given more weight than merely prima facie 
evidence of negligence. In cases where dangerous activities and the 
violation of pure food statutes are involved, the violation of a statute 
can amount to negligence perse, a form of strict liability. In Ostash v. 
Sonnenberg,3% for example, the Alberta Court of Appeal was faced 
with a violation of the Gas Protection Act of Alberta. Although the 
court was able to decide the case on the basis of dangerous things, the 
court went on, in a dictum, to deal with "an additional ground". 
Smith C. J. A. reasoned : 
I have no doubt that the provisions of the Gas Protection Act and the 
Regulations made under it and the Installation Code adopted and brought 
into force pursuant to it, were all enacted for the protection of persons in 
the position of the Ostash family amongst others. The duty to take care to 
avoid injury was therefore established ; the particular standard of care was 
thereby established. The duty to the injured person to take care was 
prescribed by the statute, Regulations and Code. The breach was proven. 
All the essentials of negligence in my opinion are present. 
This decision seems to place a type of strict liability upon any violator 
of a statute such as the Gas Protection Act.34 
A newer case treating a statute in this way is Northern Helicop-
ters Ltd. v. Vancouver.Soaring Associaiion et al.,3i where a helicopter 
collided in mid-air with a glider, killing both pilots. Both pilots had 
violated the Air Regulations passed under the authority of the 
Aeronauiics Act, R.S.C. 1952, Ch. 2. Mr. Justice Berger rationalised 
his use of these provisions as follows : 
We have the Air Regulations. They law down a set of rules governing 
aircraft. They can be applied to the case at bar. They establish a 
reasonable standard of care. In my view, the court ought to apply those 
Regulations in a sensible way that takes into account the nature of flight 
and the special characteristics of the aircraft that collided here... To apply 
the law as developed in automobile cases or in collisions at sea, would 
involve the risk of introducing rules that might well be arbitrary and 
insensitive to the peculiarities of flight. 
Now, the Air Regulations are not a code governing civil liability on 
aircraft collisions. But they do represent a reasonable standard of care to 
be observed. A failure to observe that standard is negligence. 
33. (1968), 67D.L.R.(2d)311. 
34. See also Van Oudenhove vv D'À oust tetl. .1970), , D.L.R. .3dd 145 5Allaa CA..) 
Electrical Protection Act violation amounting to "evidence of negligence" [sic]. 
35. (1972), 31 D.L.R. (3d) 321 (B.C.S.C.). 
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In this case, both pilots were in breach of their statutory duty and 
liability was split 66-2/3 against the plaintiff and 33 1/3 against the 
defendant. 
There is another recent case where legislation has been invoked in 
tort litigation. In Stavast v. Ludwar,36 the defendant's son left his 
automobile unlocked with the engine running on a parking lot of a 
beer parlour while he went inside to talk to his parents. The car was 
stolen by an unknown person who, while driving it, collided with the 
plaintiffs vehicle, causing damage. Judge Gansner imposed liability 
upon the defendant for the damage so caused. He relied, in part, upon 
s. 182 of the Motor-vehicule Act of British Columbia which made it an 
offence for any person to leave his motor vehicle standing or parking 
without having stopped the engine, locking the ignition, removing the 
key and braking the vehicle. In his reasons for judgment the learned 
trial judge concluded : 
Obviously s. 182 was enacted with a view to reducing the opportunities for 
the theft of motor vehicles. An unattended vehicle left temporarily on a 
little-travelled country road with its motor running is unlikely to provide 
many opportunities for theft. Another so left unattended on a city street is, 
of course, in graver danger of being stolen. It is rather difficult to conceive 
of a riskier place to leave a motor vehicle with its engine running than at 
night on a street 10 feet away from the door of a beer parlour. 
His Honour felt that the violation of this statute was an "effective 
cause" of the loss and, therefore, imposed responsibility. 
The courts are wise to rely on criminal statutes in civil cases, at 
least to some extent. Utilizing them as prima facie evidence of 
negligence is sensible, as a general rule, because it places the onus 
upon an offending defendant to disprove negligence. This demonstra-
tes that the violation of a penal statute is taken seriously in civil courts 
and not ignored. At the same time, it permits evidence of excuse to be 
offered by a defendant who has one. There is nothing inconsistent in 
civil courts affording even greater force to penal statutes involving 
dangerous activities or the distribution of food, and treating their 
violation as negligence per se, for the law should permit no excuse at 
all to those who cause damage while engaging in these activities. Any 
contravention of such statutes should lead inevitably to liability for 
any damage that results. 
There is one anomaly that I should like to point out. Even though 
evidence of facts that prove that there has been a violation is 
admissible in a tort case, under Hollington v. Hewthorne,31 proof of a 
36. [1974] 5W.W.R.380(GansnerCo.Ct.J.). 
37. [1943] K.B. 587. 
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criminal conviction for this conduct is inadmissible as evidence. If 
there has been a guilty plea, however, this is admissible as an 
admission.38 The fact of a conviction of a criminal offence, as a result 
of the conduct being complained of, should be admissible as prima 
facie evidence of negligence in a civil case.3' This should reduce 
expense and bring tort law and criminal law into closer correspon-
dence. 
b) Violation of Penal Statute bb Plaintiff 
Many examples exist of a plaintiffs violation of a penal statute 
amounting to contributory negligence.40 Such conduct by a plaintiff is 
treated in exactly the same way as if it were by a defendant. It is 
similarly justified. 
There has been a bizarre new development, however, that 
deserves mention for there is a danger that the old harshness of the 
common law, in its treatment of contributory negligence, will be 
reactivated. In addition to the defences of contributory negligence and 
voluntary assumption of risk, Canadian courts seem to have resurrec-
ted an ancient defence, based on the principle of ex turpi causa non 
oritur actio, which I prefer to describe as the defence of illegality. In 
the event that an injured plaintiff is guilty of criminal conduct at the 
time he is injured, some courts have seen fit to deny him recovery 
altogether, even though this has been strenuously criticised by 
scholars.41 
One recent case invoking this defence is Tomlinson v. Harrison.42 
The plaintiff, the defendant and a third person, after having drunk a 
large quantity of beer, stole a car. They went for a drive, with the 
defendant at the wheel, drinking beer as they roared along at 100 
m.p.h. They were spotted by a police cruiser which gave chase. In 
trying to elude apprehension, the car went off the road and the plaintiff 
was injured. Mr. Justice Addy held that the action was barred, both 
because of the principle of ex turpi causa non oritur actio and because 
of voluntary assumption of risk. 
38. Ferris v. Monaghan (1956), 4 4.L.R. (2d) 539 (N.B.B.C.). 
39. The Compensation for Victims of Crime Act, S.O. 19719 c. 51, s. 11, 1reats evievnce of o 
conviction as conclusive proof that a crime was committed. 
40. See Satterlee v. Orange ((947), ,17 7. (2d) 279. 
41. Gibson, "Illegality of Plaintiff's Conduct as a Defence", (1969) 47 Can. Bar Rev. .89 ;ee 
also Fridman, "The Wrongdoing Plaintiff", (1972) 18 McGill LJ. 275; Weinrib, 
"Illegality as a Tort Defence", (1976) 26 U.T.L.J. 28. 
42. [1972] 1O.R.670. 
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His Lordship felt that the plaintiff was an active party to several 
offences, including theft of both cars, drinking while driving, driving 
while intoxicated, and reckless or dangerous driving. His Lordship 
explained : 
... there was a common intention to pursue not only an unlawful purpose 
but a criminal purpose at the time of the accident and the damage suffered 
by the plaintiff was a direct and readily foreseeable result of that common 
purpose. 
His Lordship reasoned further : 
I feel that the defence of ex turpi is part and parcel of the law of torts in the 
province and is available as a defence when all the necessary elements are 
present. When two criminals are pursuing a joint criminal venture and, in 
the attainment of the criminal object, one of them happens to be injured, 
and when the occurrence from which the injury results is a natural and 
probable consequence of the attempt to attain the criminal object, I fail to 
see why our courts should give any relief to one of them who happens to be 
injured in the process, or how, or why our courts, in such a case, should 
proceed to apply to the conduct of one of them the test of what a 
reasonable man would do in those circumstances in order to give some 
relief to the other. Although there might possibly be some question 
whether today, in this jurisdiction, the defence of ex turpi is available as 
between two parties involved in an unlawful act constituting a mere breach 
of a penal statute or a minor offence of the nature of those formerly known 
at common law as misdemeanours, it is available as in the present case 
between two parties involved in the commission of an indictable offence. 
Another decision involving this matter is Tallow v. Tailfeat hers.^ 
A group of young men stole a car following some heavy drinking. 
Predictably, serious injury and death ensued when a car crash ended 
the revelry. The majority of the Alberta Court of Appeal ruled that the 
plaintiffs action must be dismissed on the ground of voluntary 
assumption of risk. Mr. Justice Clement concurred, but preferred to 
rest his decision on ex turpi causa. During the course of a long and 
learned opinion, these comments appeared : 
... I understand that the positive law, of which Lord Mansfield spoke in the 
context of an immoral or illegal act, [in a contract setting] is one that 
prohibits the commission of an act that has such a quality of turpitude that 
it must be regarded as anti-social. The cause of action must arise out of the 
commission of that act, and the participation of the claimant in the act. 
Thus, the applicability of the rule is dependent on behaviour on the 
part of the plaintiff which in its nature and degree is inimical to the 
interests of society, and on his claim against the defendant "arising" out of 
43. [1973J 6 W.W.R. 732 (Alta. C.A.); cf. Bigcharles et al. v. Merkel et al., [1973) 1 W.W.R. 
324 (B.C.S.C.) : burglar, who negligently shot by defendant during escape, held 75 percent 
contributorily negligent. 
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that behaviour. Both must concur to warrant denial of his claim. 
Judgment must be based, not on the social and legal structure of a past 
century, but on the present changes and changing conditions of society and 
the proliferating controls of conduct in the pervasive juridical system by 
which it is governed... 
Another decision, that raises the tantalizing possibility of invo-
king the Negligence Act in cases of illegality, is Lewis v. Sayers.44 An 
intoxicated owner of a vehicle allowed an intoxicated friend to drive 
them both on a short trip in the course of which the driver negligently 
collided with a parked car. The defence of volenti was held not to 
apply because there was no bargain, express or implied, to give up his 
right of action. Gould D. C. J., nevertheless, apportioned liability 50-
50 on the ground that the Ontario Negligence Act covered such 
conduct. He explained: 
The defendant relied mainly upon the maxim ex turpi causa non oritur 
actio and this matter was argued at length and requires serious considera-
tion. If the defendant should succeed in establishing either of these special 
defences, my previous findings as to negligence and respective degrees of 
fault would be of no importance, as the plaintiff would be absolutely 
debarred from recovering against the defendant. I was referred to the 
article on thia subject by Mr. Dale Gibson printed in 47 Can. Bar Rev. 89 
(1969), and to a long list of cases, many of which are referred to in the 
article... 
These cases, of course, make it very clear that the maxim ex turpi 
causa non oritur actio under proper circumstances applies and is 
frequently used in our courts. 
The two Manitoba cases of Ridgeway v. Hilhorst and Rondos v. 
Wawrin, although different in their facts from the present case, both 
suggest that the ex turpi causa doctrine might apply here. An important 
consideration, however, is that the Manitoba statute which corresponds to 
s. 4 of the Ontario Negligence Act is worded differently, in that it refers 
only to negligence rather than to fault or negligence. The result would 
appear to be that the Ontario statute applies to a considerably wider range 
of situations than the Manitoba Act. Section 4 of the Ontario Negligence 
Act reads as follows: 
4. In any action for damages that is founded upon the fault or negligence 
of the defendant if fault or negligence is found on the part of the 
plaintiff that contributed to the damages, the court shall apportion the 
damages in proportion to the degree of fault or negligence found 
against the parties respectively. 
It appears to me that in a case to which, by reason of its facts, s. 4 of 
the Negligence Act applies, the Ontario Legislature has quite deliberately 
substituted for the ex turpi causa rule a positive direction that the court 
shall make a finding as to the degree of fault or negligence to be attributed 
to each party and shall apportion the damages accordingly. I realize of 
44. (1971), 13 D.L.R. (3d) 543 (Ontt Dist. Ct.). 
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course that s. 4 was enacted primarily to do away with the absolute 
defence formerly available in cases of contributory negligence, but the 
wording is equally apt in relation to the defence now under discussion, to 
which the added words "fault or" seem to apply with particular force. The 
defence ex turpi causa non oritur actio seems necessarily to involve a 
situation where both parties are alleged to be at fault, and so long as it is 
remembered that s. 4 applies only where the fault of each has contributed 
to the damages, in my opinion the section leaves no room for the 
application of the maxim. 
If the defence of ex turpi causa is to be re-introduced into tort law 
to deny people recovery altogether because of their wrongdoing, it 
would be too harsh a doctrine to accept. To ignore a plaintiffs 
wrongdoing, however, is also unsuitable. It just does not seem 
appropriate, when their losses arise out of wrongdoing, to award an 
injured burglar or car thief damages in the same way as an innocent 
plaintiff. An acceptable compromise might be the one hinted at by 
Gould D. C. J. in Lewis v. Sayers: that is, the plaintiffs illegal 
conduct, if it contributed to his injury, could be relied on to reduce his 
recovery under the Negligence Act, but not to deny him recovery 
altogether. Hence, the defence of illegality would be incorporated into 
the defence of contributory negligence, which is a much more humane 
and flexible instrument. 
2. Compliance with the Criminal Law 
Although violation of penal statute has been relied on in civil 
cases to impose liability, compliance with legislation has not been 
permitted invariably to excuse otherwise tortious conduct. The courts 
have wisely concluded that a violator of a penal statute is not only 
criminally liable, but he should normally be held civilly liable for the 
damage he has caused. They have also rightly determined that, merely 
because someone's conduct has not violated any criminal law, he 
should not necessarily escape civil liability. One can be liable civilly 
without attracting any criminal responsibility whatsoever, although, if 
one is criminally liable, he should normally also be civilly responsible 
for any loss resulting. There is a great deal of overlap between civil 
and criminal law, but they are not, and should not be, identical. 
Certain conduct may deserve to attract civil responsibility but may not 
be so reprehensible as to attract penal responsibility. That is the whole 
point of two separate regimes of social control. 
Let us examine several areas where this approach has been 
manifested : 
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a) Compliance with Statute Not An Excuse 
Civil courts have recognized that, merely because a defendant 
acts in compliance with the criminal law, he is not necessarily immune 
from tort liability. For example, even though a motorist violates no 
penal speeding law, he may still be found liable for travelling too fast 
in the circumstances. Mr. Justice Orde once declared that "mere 
compliance with statutory and motor vehicle regulations is not 
sufficient". ' ' Consequently, even though a motorist is not guilty of any 
speeding offence, he can be held civilly negligent for excessive speed in 
circumstances of poor visibility/6 heavy pedestrian traffic,47 dange-
rous road conditions,48 and substandard vehicular equipment.4'' 
There are some railway cases, where the courts have refused to 
relieve the defendant railway from liability when it was argued that 
they could not be found negligent if they complied with all the 
provisions of the Railway Act. The Supreme Court of Canada has 
repeatedly indicated that it is not always enough for a railway merely 
to comply with the legislation, and that liability for negligence can be 
found if there are "special circumstances" that require more than the 
usual precautions.30 
One leading case exploring these questions is Bux v. Slough 
Metals Ltd.,11 where the plaintiff injured his eye when he was splashed 
by some molten metal which he was moving from a furnace. The 
evidence indicated that if he had been wearing the safety goggles which 
the employer was required by Regulation to supply, he would not have 
been injured. The goggles had been provided to the workers but, to the 
employer's knowledge, they were not used because the lenses tended to 
mist up very quickly. The employer did not enforce the wearing of the 
goggles. The court found that there was no breach of statutory duty 
but, nevertheless, held the employer negligent at common law for not 
45. Whitten v. Burtwell {(920), 44 O.L.R. .10, aa t. 215. See elso Martin v. Powell (1928), 62 
O.L.R. 436. 
46. Gregory v. Pepe ((954)) ,4 M.L.R. 93 ; ;uttan v. O'Connor-Fenton (1929), 44 O.4.R. 208 
(CA.); Ristow v. Wetstein, [1934] S.C.R. 128, at p. 131 ; ;se Canadian Negligence Law, 
1972, at p. 145 ff. 
47. Stanley v. National Fruit Co., [1931] S.C.R. 60, at p. 68; Canadian Negligence Law, 
at p. 147 ff. 
48. Goldsmith v. Bentley, [1937] O.W.N. 280 ; see Canadiad Negligence Law, at p. 149. 
49. Wing v. Banks, [ 1947] O.W.N. 897 : 7:b tire. 
50. Paskiviski v. C.P. Ltd. .(976)) ,5 D.L.R. .3d) 2800 Weiss v. Larson (1965), 55 D.L.R. (2d) 
330 (Alta. CA.). 
51. [1974] 1 A l E.R. 262 (CA.). 
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forcing the employees to use the goggles or for not providing better 
ones. The employer argued that compliance with the statutory duty 
absolved him from any breach of his common law duty. In response to 
this, Stephenson L. J. stated:" 
There is, in my judgment, no presumption that a statutory obligation 
abrogates or supersedes the employer's common law duty or that it defines 
or measures his common law duty either by clarifying it or by cutting it 
down — or indeed by extending it. It is not necessarily exhaustive ofthat 
duty or co-extensive with it and I do not, with all due respect to counsel for 
the defendants' argument, think it possible to lay down conditions in 
which it is exhaustive or to conclude that it is so in this case. The statutory 
obligation may exceed the duty at common law or it may fall short of it or 
it may equal it. The court has always to construe the statute or statutory 
instrument which imposes the obligation, consider the facts of the 
particular case and the allegations of negligence in fact made by the 
particular workman and then decide whether, if the statutory obligation 
has been performed, any negligence has been proved. In some cases such 
proof will be difficult or impossible ; in others it may be easy. 
In imposing statutory duties whose breach may give an injured 
workman a right of action against his employer, Parliament cannot be 
presumed to have intended to take from the courts their duty of deciding 
whether his employer has taken reasonable care of the workman and what 
the extent ofthat duty is. In this case I venture to think in every case where 
a plaintiff has alleged a breach of statutory duty, he is entitled to allege 
negligence at common law and to ask the court to answer the question 
whether he has proved negligence, irrespective of his having proved a 
breach of statutory duty. In this case the plaintiff, having failed to prove a 
breach of statutory duty, can certainly ask the court to decide whether a 
prudent employer ought to have done more for his safety by way of 
persuading, instructing or ordering him to wear goggles than his em-
ployers did. 
The court also held that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent to 
the extent of 40 percent. 
There are other situations where legislation requires certain 
safety measures, which if complied with, do not always guarantee 
immunity to the defendant. Take, for example, the safety features 
mandated for automobiles. Even though a manufacturer incorporates 
all the required equipment into its vehicles, it can still be argued that 
others, not required by law, should also have been included.53 
Similarly, obedience to legislative provisions for labelling may not 
suffice to meet the standard of the reasonable person in all cases.54 
52. Ibid., at pp. 272-273. 
53. See Larsen v. General Motors (1968), 391 F. (2d) 495. 
54. Compare with Lamberts. Lastoplex Chemicals (1971), 25 D.D.L. (3d3d)12 
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This is a wise strategy for private law. The penal standards in the 
safety area are properly viewed as a minimum, below which actors 
cannot fall without incurring civil responsibility in addition to criminal 
liability. This does not and should not mean, however, that tort law 
cannot be more demanding of actors than is the criminal law. Because 
it deals only with civil sanctions, in the context of an injured person 
seeking financial recompense, tort law could well decide to exert its 
gentler influence for safety by imposing civil liability, even though no 
penal infraction has occurred. 
b) Nuisance, Strict Liability and Legislative euthority 
Another interesting area, where public law and private law 
intersect, is tort law's treatment of legislative authority in nuisance 
and strict liability situations. The basic principles of tort law are 
affected to some extent by this intrusion of public law, but they are not 
obliterated altogether. The basic principle emerging from the cases, as 
always, is one of compromise — where an activity is legislatively 
authorized, no nuisance or strict liability is imposed, unless the 
defendant is found to have been "negligent". 
This partial immunity was first enunciated in 1860 in the case of 
Vaughan v. Taff Vale Railway Co.,"* where it was said that, when the 
legislature has "sanctioned the use of particular means... the parties 
are not liable for any injury... unless they have contributed to it by 
some negligence"." Consequently, courts have distinguished 
between one group of activities, which may subject an enterprise 
to nuisance or strict liability, and another group of legislatively 
authorized activities, which do not import liability, except where 
some fault is proven.57 
The main rationale for this partial immunity (in addition to 
history) is the old standby of the intention of the legislature. It is 
pretty obvious, however, that no intention with regard to civil liability 
is usually articulated in the statute. It is, therefore, up to the courts to 
determine the best way to treat these legislatively authorized activities. 
As might be expected, the common law courts have sought to 
preserve the protection afforded individuals by its principles and have 
stoutly resisted the invasion of public law. Various legal devices have 
55. (1860), 5H.&N.679. 
56. Ibid., at p. 396, per Cockburn J. 
57. See Linden, "Strict Liability, Nuisance and Legislative Authorization", (1966) 4 O.H.LJ. 
196. 
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been employed in this endeavour. One such device is to construe 
strictly the legislation authorizing the activity in question. One court 
has proclaimed that grants of legislative authority are not "charters to 
commit torts".58 Nor do they grant a "carte blanche" to create 
nuisances.59 Consequently, unless the legislation clearly authorizes the 
particular activity in question, the civil courts will impose liability as 
they normally do. The courts have held that there was no legislative 
intention to grant any immunity where some locomotive sparks set fire 
to a haystack,60 where sewage was emetted from an authorized 
building,61 where a nuisance was caused by a sewer,62 a smallpox 
hospital,63 or a horse stable,64 and other similar situations. 
Another technique used by the courts to limit the impact of 
legislative authorization has been to restrict the notion of implied 
authority. The courts will imply a legislative intention to authorize 
certain harm only where the damage is a necessary or inevitable result 
of the authorized act.65 Consequently, an intention to excuse the 
defendant from liability is rarely implied, but it once was where 
vibrations were caused by a locomotive, on an authorized railway, 
because this could not possibly be avoided.66 
A similar interpretation method adopted by certain courts is that 
the authorizing legislation was not intended to legalize damage 
because it was "permissive" only and not "imperative".67 A variation 
on this language has been urged by Salmond, who suggests that the 
legislation should be examined to discover whether the authority is 
"absolute" or "conditional".68 If it is absolute, the immunity should 
be invoked, but if it is conditional, it should be concluded that the 
legislature intended the act to be done only if it could be done without 
harming anybody. These spurious rationales make little sense, but 
they do manifest the lengths to which courts will go to try to reduce the 
impact of public law on historic tort rights. 
58. Quebec Raiiway Co. .v Vandry, y,920] A.A. 662, at p. 679. 
39. Midwood v. Manchester, [1905] 2 2.B. 597, at p. 6060 
60. Jones v. FestiniogRailway (1868), 3 Q.B. 7737 cf. C.P.R. v. Roy,.[l902] A.C. 220. 
61. A.G. v. Colney Hatch Lunatic Asylum (1869)) 19 L.T.R. 708; Burgess s. Woodstock, 
[1955] O.R. 814. 
62. A.G. v.£eeds (1610), 22L.T.R. 320,atp.331. 
63. Metropolitan Asylum v. /////( 1881), 6 6pp. Cas. s93. 
64. Rapier v. London Trrmways, s,[939 2 Ch. 588. 
65. Manchester v. Farnworth, h,930] A.A. 171 7 Whitehouse v. Fellowes 10 C.B. (N.S.) 765, at 
p. 870. 
66. Hammersmith v. Brand, L.L. 4 4.L.L.17 
67. See Burniston vv Corp. of Bangor, [1932] N.I. 178. 
68. The Lawof Torts, 1601 Ed.. 1973, at p. 520. 
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Civil courts have also shifted the onus of proof in these cases to 
the defendant to demonstrate that his otherwise tortious conduct was 
authorized by the legislation and that the damage caused was 
inevitable.69 
The courts have also manifested their antipathy toward the 
immunity by fashioning a specialized definition of the word "negli-
gence", as used in the context of the partial immunity. Ordinarily, 
negligence is the absence of reasonable care in the circumstances, 
having regard to the gravity of the harm, the likelihood of its 
occurrence and the utility of the defendant's conduct. Rather than 
adopt this normal meaning in this context, the courts have narrowed it 
by holding that "if the damages could be prevented it is, within the 
rule, 'negligence' not to make such reasonable exercise of powers".70 
Similarly, it has been suggested that "it is negligence to carry out 
work in a manner which results in damage unless it can be shown that 
that, and that only, was the way in which the duty could be 
performed".71 The defendant who wishes to rely on legislative 
authority as a defence, therefore, must convince the court that the 
activity was carried on in the only way possible ; if he fails, he will be 
held to be "negligent" and, consequently, outside the protection of the 
partial immunity. 
In deciding whether a court will restrict the operation of these 
legislatively authorised activities, various policy factors are taken into 
account, which is as it should be. The immunity will tend to be invoked 
and recovery denied where a plaintiff is seeking to gain increased 
compensation by avoiding a statutory compensation scheme, where 
the defendant is a non-profit-making operation, where the authority is 
by statute rather than by an inferior legislative enactment, and where a 
particularly important industry is involved. On the other hand, courts 
will tend to avoid the immunity and impose nuisance or strict liability 
where the defendant is a profit-making organization, where the 
legislative authority is a by-law or governmental contract, where the 
defendant's conduct was particularly reprehensible and where the loss 
could easily have been avoided.72 
Consequently, there is visible a healthy tension between the 
established private law and the public law intruder. Private law in this 
area has been altered to some extent by the public law, but the civil 
69. Linden, op. cit. supra, footnote 57, at p. 
70. Geddis v. Bann (1878), 3 App. Cas. 430, at p. 455. 
71. Provencher Millers v. Southampton, [1940] 1 Ch. 131, at p. 140. 
72. See Linden, supra, footnote 57, at p. 206. 
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courts have not surrendered completely. They have struggled to 
circumscribe the impact of authorizing legislation and have preserved, 
as best as they could, the pre-existing private rights. The philosophy that 
emerges from the cases is that, if legislatures wish to immunize certain 
activities for the public good, they should do so expressly and provide 
for alternative compensation to the victims of this exercise of public 
power. If they do not do so expressly, the duty of private law is to 
protect the private rights of the individuals damaged without doing 
violence to the legislation. 
c) Specific Defences in Criminal Code : S.25(4) 
Sometimes the civil courts do not resist sufficiently the encroach-
ment of public law and fall prostrate before it. Take, for example, tort 
law's treatment of s. 25(4) of the Criminal Code which reads : 
(4) A peace officer who is proceeding lawfully to arrest, with or without 
warrant, any person for an offence for which that person may be 
arrested without warrant, and every one lawfully assisting the peace 
officer, is justified, if the person to be arrested takes flight to avoid 
arrest, in using as much force as is necessary to prevent the escape by 
flight, unless the escape can be prevented by reasonable means in a less 
violent manner. 
The leading case on this point is Priestman v. Colangelo and 
Smythson.13 Smythson, a 17-year-old youth, stole a car and was 
driving along Donlands Avenue in East York, when he was detected 
by two police officers who were patrolling in a police car. The boy 
quickly drove off along Mortimer Ave., a side street, and the 
policemen pursued him in an attempt to apprehend him. The police 
car tried to pass the stolen car on three occasions, but each time 
Smythson pulled over to thwart this. One of the policemen then fired a 
warning shot into the air. The youth's vehicle only increased its speed. 
The officer then took aim at the left rear tire and fired. Unfortunately, 
the police vehicle at that moment hit a bump, and the bullet went 
through the rear window of the vehicle, striking the driver in the neck, 
and causing him to lose consciousness. The car went out of control and 
fatally injured two young girls, who were waiting for a bus. The 
Supreme Court of Canada, in a three-two decision, ultimately 
dismissed the claims of the girls' families against the police officers, on 
the ground that the hazard they created was not too great in the light 
of the social value of capturing a "criminal whose actions... constitute 
73. Priestman v. Colangelo and Smythson, [1,59] S.C.R. 61.6 
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a menace to other members of the public". In attempting to stop this 
fleeing car, the policemen were not obligated to risk their lives again 
and "no other reasonable or practical means of halting the car [had] 
been suggested than to slacken its speed by blowing out one of the 
tires". The court observed that the police could not do anything that 
came into their mind in order to apprehend a criminal, but certain 
reasonable risks could be taken for this purpose. For example, it 
would be permissible to bump into someone while pursuing a 
pickpocket in a crowd or to damage private property in order to catch 
a bank robber who was hiding there or to shoot at an escaping bank 
robber who had murdered a bank employee and was firing his revolver 
at the police officers who were pursuing him. A policeman, however, 
cannot fire into a crowd in the hope of stopping a fleeing criminal who 
was obscured from view. Mr. Justice Locke, writing for the majority, 
relied, in part, on s. 25 of the Criminal Code (and the Police Act) 
which he felt might furnish a "complete defence" in certain circums-
tances. 
Mr. Justice Cartwright, dissenting, after balancing the serious 
risk and the utility of apprehending the offender, concluded that the 
officer was negligent, and that he was not excused by s. 25(4) of the 
Criminal Code. In explaining his position, Cartwright J. reasoned: 
The question of difficulty is whether the justification afforded by the sub-
section is intended to operate only as between the peace officer and the 
offender who is in flight or to extend to injuries inflicted, by the force used 
for the purpose of apprehending the offender, upon innocent bystanders 
unconnected with the flight or pursuit otherwise than by the circumstance 
of their presence in the vicinity. The words of the subsection appear to me 
to be susceptible to either interpretation and that being so I think we ought 
to ascribe to them the more restricted meaning. In my opinion, if 
Parliament intended to enact that grievous bodily harm or death might be 
inflicted upon an entirely innocent person and that such person or his 
dependants should be deprived of all civil remedies to which they would 
otherwise have been entitled, in circumstances such as are present in this 
case it would have used words declaring such intention without any 
possible ambiguity... 
I conclude that the first main ground upon which Priestman's appeal 
is based fails and pass to the second, which raises the question whether the 
two fatalities were contributed to by negligence on the part of Priestman. 
Under s. 45 of the Police Act, R.S.O. 1950, c. 279, Priestman was 
charged with the duty of apprehending Smythson... This duty to appre-
hend was not, in my opinion, an absolute one to the performance of which 
Priestman was bound regardless of the consequences to persons other than 
Smythson. Co-existent with the duty to apprehend Smythson was the 
fundamental duty alterum non Icedere, not to do an act which a reasonable 
man placed in Priestman's position should have foreseen was likely to 
cause injury to persons in the vicinity. 
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The opinion of Cartwright, J. is preferable to that of the majority. 
By interpreting narrowly the language used, it restricts the operation 
of s. 25(4) of the Code so as not to apply to innocent third persons. 
This is sound. His Lordship might even have restricted the section 
further, so as to immunize the police officers only from criminal 
liability to the escaping offender and not from civil liability to him. Or, 
he might even have interpreted the section to authorize the force used 
only as long as there was no negligence displayed in its use. Such an 
interpretation would correspond more closely to the sturdy indepen-
dence of tort law, as evinced in the legislative authorization cases. 
Indeed, one might even have argued that Parliament has no business 
interfering with private rights, which are within the exclusive legisla-
tive jurisdiction of the provinces.74 
A contrasting case is Beim v. Goyer,1* where a policeman 
accidentally shot a car thief he was chasing over rough ground. The 
officer was carrying his gun at the time and had previously fired 
several warning shots. The policeman was held liable by the Supreme 
Court of Canada because an unarmed boy running away on foot posed 
no danger to the officer or to anyone else. Mr. Justice Ritchie 
distinguished Priestman v. Colangelo since, in that case, it was 
reasonably necessary for the policeman to fire at the tire. Mr. Justice 
Martland dissented, and suggested that there was nothing wrong with 
firing some warning shots into the air while running, because, if the 
officer had stopped before firing, the chances are that the person would 
have escaped. He distinguished Priestman, where the shot was 
deliberately fired, from this case where the gun was discharged 
accidentally. According to Mr. Justice Martland it was not even 
necessary for the officer to rely upon s. 25(4) of the,Criminal Code to 
excuse his conduct. 
See also Woodward v. Begbie,lb where a similar result ensued 
when the plaintiff, a prowler, was accidentally shot by one of two 
policemen who fired their pistols intending to hit the ground near the 
fleeing suspect. Mr. Justice McLennan held that s. 25(4) did not 
immunize the defendant because "more force was used than was 
necessary and the escape could have been prevented by the more 
reasonable means of overtaking the plaintiff...". 
74. See, generally : McDonald, "Use of Force by Police to Effect Lawful Arrest", (1966-1967) 
9 Crim. L.Q. 435. 
75. (1966), 57 D.L.R.(2d)253(S.C.G). 
76. [1962JO.R.60. 
854 Les Cahiers de Droii (1976) 17 C. deD. 838 
Another recent decision is Poupart v. Lafortune,11 where the 
Supreme Court of Canada dealt with the question of whether s. 25 
applied to exempt a police officer from liability for a gun shot wound 
he accidentally inflicted on an innocent bystander, when some armed 
robbers opened fire on him after he tried to apprehend them. Fauteux 
C. J. C. stated: 
First, I should say that if only because of the decision of this Court in the 
Priestman case, supra, there is no reason to doubt, in my view, that the 
justification created by the aforementioned provisions of s. 25 relieves the 
police officer of any civil or criminal liability, not only in respect of the 
fugitive but also in respect of any person who accidentally becomes an 
innocent victim of the force used by such an officer in the circumstances 
described in those provisions... 
... in constrast with the driver of an automobile, Lafortune was not 
engaged merely in performing an act permitted by law, but, which is quite 
a different matter... he was engaged in the hazardous performance of a 
grave duty imposed on him by law. In carrying out such a duty a peace 
officer must undoubtedly refrain from making any unjustifiable use of the 
powers relating to it... 
However, while a police officer is not relieved of a duty to take 
reasonable care, that is care the degree of which must be determined in 
relation to the particular circumstances of the case to be decided, the 
actions of Lafortune cannot, in a case like that before the Court, be 
evaluated as they would be if it were a case in which the precautions to be 
taken in accordance with the duty not to injure others were not 
conditioned by the requirements of a public duty. In short, the police 
officer incurs no liability for damage caused to another when without 
negligence he does precisely what the legislature requires him to do : see 
Priestman case, supra. Interpreted otherwise the justification provided by 
s. 25(4) would be reduced to a nullity. 
One might conclude that, since there was a finding of no 
negligence on the facts of Poupart, s. 25 was totally irrelevant to the 
decision of the case. In other words, no liability was found because 
there was no negligence — not because of s. 25. 
Even if there is a finding of negligence, however, s. 25 should not 
be used to immunize the police from the civil consequences of their 
negligence. It should be restricted in scope only to excuse the police 
from criminal liability for their conduct. Such an interpretation would 
be more in harmony with the treatment of public law by private law in 
other contexts. Just because someone is not criminally liable for his 
conduct, this does not mean that he should escape civil liability for it. 
The civil law might well choose to impose liability for certain 
substandard conduct if harm is caused thereby, whereas the criminal 
77. (1974), 41 D.L.R.(3d)720(S.C.C). 
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law would not wish to invoke its harsher sanctions to control the 
conduct. It may well be that, although negligently shooting someone 
on occasion is acceptable policy for the criminal law, it is not 
permissible for purposes of private law. In other words, even though 
penal law permits injury to individuals during law enforcement, tort 
law may require compensation to the victim. 
IV 
Private Law's Infiltration of Public Law 
Although the invasion of private law by public law is a familiar 
phenomenon, the intrusion of private law into public law's preserve is 
relatively novel. The reason for private law's infiltration into public 
law is the same as that which fuels public law's intervention into 
private law — that is, the performance of public law is perceived by 
aggrieved individuals to be less than satisfactory. In other words, the 
tools of public law, although normally adopted to rectify the failures 
of private law, sometimes prove inadequate to the task. It should come 
as no surprise that public law, too, can be insensitive and unrespon-
sive. Public law, too, can be ineffective, sluggish and too costly. It, too, 
can be oppressive and appear to be the enemy of the people, rather 
than their friend. Government and public agencies often appear 
undemocratic and unaccountable to anyone. As the public demands 
more responsiveness from those who exercise power in society 
challenges to the exercise of public power are increasing in frequency! 
One method whereby governmental power may be questioned is the 
private action for damages which on occasion may be even more 
effective than other protective techniques 
I have argued elsewhere that tort law can function very much like 
an ombudsman.78 Not only are the damages paid a deterrent to 
wrongdoing, but the publicity sanction, that can be directed against a 
defendant, may also encourage greater care. Negative publicity can 
hurt the defendant in three ways: (1) it can cost him money by 
reducing sales, the value of shares or the amount of public money 
appropriated on his behalf; (2) bad publicity may bring about a loss of 
prestige ; and (3) it can induce governmental intervention if it discloses 
conditions that are felt to require a legislative response. Consequently, 
the power of a tort suit should not be underestimated. 
78. "Tort Law as Ombudsman", (1973) 51 Can.BarRev. 155. 
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Let me examine several recent examples of private law's intrusion 
into public law. I will deal with tort cases in the main, but there are 
examples in most other fields of private law. 
1. Control of the Police 
Private law performs a valuable function in seeking to control the 
conduct of the police. That this task is thought to be of critical import 
to society is witnessed by the number of special studies that have been 
commissioned on the question in the last few years.79 It must be 
admitted that the criminal law is largely impotent as a technique for 
the. control of the police, because policemen themselves are largely in 
charge of the criminal process and, not unexpectedly, they are less 
than zealous in regulating themselves thereby.80 Similarly, the exclu-
sionary rules of evidence are of little consequence in Canada. The best 
hope for supervision of the police is probably administrative self-
regulation, but these methods, too, lack the necessary objectivity and 
credibility to be widely accepted by the public.81 
By default, therefore, and not by choice, tort law has emerged as 
one of the prime techniques for filling the vacuum. As in other 
situations, the perceived failure of public law to perform the task of 
control adequately has stimulated individuals to rely on private law 
tools for their protection. The old tort remedies such as assault, 
battery, trespass, false imprisonment and negligence are available as 
weapons to be used by citizens against wrongdoing policemen and, if 
they are successful, the police chief is made financially responsible in 
addition to the offending officer.82 The chances of success are much 
better in a tort action before a jury, or before a Judge other than a 
Provincial Court Judge, who may come to trust the veracity of police 
officers too much because of continuous contact with them. Since 
financial damages are awarded to the plaintiff, with exemplary 
damages in addition possibly, he has a financial incentive to pursue 
this remedy in addition to any others he may have. As a result of these 
civil actions the public may be informed about the allegations of the 
complainant, the defence of the police, and the result. A mere private 
79. Studies have been conducted by Mr. Justice Morand, His Honour Judge Shapiro, His 
Honour Judge M or in and by Arthur Maloney, Q.C. 
80. Weiler, "The Control of Police Arrest Practices : Reflections of a Tort Lawyer", in Studies 
in Canadian Tort Law, 1968. 
81. Grant, "The Control of Police Behaviour", in Some Civil Liberties Issues of the Seventies, 
Tarnopolsky, ed., 1974. 
82. Police Act. R.S.O. 1970, c. 351, s. 24(1) : municipality may pay. 
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complaint to a police commission may be too easily buried and may 
never attract any public attention at all. Consequently, tort law serves 
as one way of overseeing police activity, and may provide some 
deterrence of substandard police behaviour. 
It is actually quite surprising to see the number of tort actions 
against the police that have been successful. For example, in the area 
of faulty arrest procedures, there is the landmark case of Christie v. 
Leachinsky,*1 where it was held that the police could not use a phony 
charge to detain a suspect. The police must tell a person the true 
reason for his arrest and detention, or they may be held civilly liable. 
Similarly, a policeman cannot just stop anyone on the street and 
question him without reasonable grounds for suspecting him of some 
criminal offence. If the policeman tries to do so, he may be resisted, 
and damages for assault or false imprisonment may be awarded 
against him.84 
The police must also avoid arresting suspected shoplifters, unless 
they have solid grounds on which to found their action.85 Merely 
because someone refuses to pay a bill in a restaurant, if there is a 
rational reason for withholding payment, this is not sufficient ground 
for an arrest.86 If the wrong person is arrested by a police officer, he 
may not be held liable if his error is a reasonable one,"7 but, once he 
discovers his mistake, he must release the person forthwith or pay 
damages.88 Even though the actions are not always successful, 
policeman may be openly challenged by citizens in tort litigation for 
assault89 or for improperly entering private premises.90 These unsuc-
cessful claims still serve to notify the public of the problem. 
These occasional tort suits, therefore, may remind the police that, 
even if they escape disciplinary or criminal proceedings for their 
misconduct, they may be answerable in a civil suit for their wrong-
doing. This cannot help but render the police more cautious and 
responsive to the interests of the individuals with whom they must deal 
in their everyday work. 
83. [1947] A.C. 573. 
84. Koechlin v. Waugh ann Hamilton (1968), 11 D.L.R. (2d) 4477 :iability oo folice eo 
teenager; Sandison v. Rybiak ((974), , O.R. .2d) 74. 
85. Lebrun v. Highlow Foods d1968), 69 D.L.R. (2d) 433. 
86. Bahner v. Marwesl (1969), 6 D.L.R. (3d) 322, afTT (1970), 12 2.L.R. (3d) 646 (B.C.C.C.) ; 
Perry v. Fried (1972), 32 D.L.R. (3d) 589 (Cowan C.J.). 
87. Fletcher v. Collins (1968), 70 D.L.R. (.d) 183 ; Crowe v. Noon, [19[197 O.R. 530. 
88. Romilly v. Wealherhead(1975), 55 D.L.L. (3d) 6070 (Hinkson J., B.B.). 
89. Levitz v. Ryan, ,[972] ] O.R. 435, afTd [1972] 3 3.O. 787 (C.A.). 
90. Eccles v. Bourque(l914),4\ D.L.L. (3d) 39392fTd 27 C.R. (N.S.) 323 25.C.C.)C 
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a) New Obligations 
There has been some push to enlarge the responsibility of the 
police beyond the traditional scope of the nominate torts and 
negligence law. New civil duties have been placed upon police officers, 
in recent years, which did not exist before. The leading case is now 
O'Rourke v. Schacht.91 A well-lighted barrier, that marked a detour 
around some construction work, was knocked over by a car at night, 
so that it was no longer visible to other motorists on the highway. The 
Ontario Provincial Police investigated the accident, but failed to take 
steps to warn the traffic about the danger on the road. The plaintiff 
was injured when he drove his automobile into the unmarked 
excavation. The Police Act of Ontario required that the Ontario 
Provincial Police, inter alia, "shall maintain a traffic patrol". The 
Highway Traffic Act of Ontario also empowered the police to "direct 
traffic" in order to "ensure orderly movement" and "to prevent injury 
or damage to persons or property". 
In the Ontario Court of Appeal, Mr. Justice Schroeder permitted 
the plaintiff to recover part of his damages against the police 
administration. Recognising that the case was a novel one, Mr. Justice 
Schroeder stated: 
Police forces exist in municipal, provincial, and federal jurisdictions to 
exercise powers designed to promote the order, safety, health, morals, and 
general welfare of society. It is not only impossible but inadvisable to 
attempt to frame a definition which will set definite limits to the powers 
and duties of police officers appointed to carry out the powers of the state 
in relation to individuals who come within its jurisdiction and protection. 
The duties imposed on them by statute are by no means exhaustive. It is 
infinitely better that the courts should decide as each case arises whether, 
having regard to the necessities of the. case and the safeguards required in 
the public interest, the police are under a legal duty in the particular 
circumstances... 
Section 55 of the Police Act which sets out the duties of members of 
a municipal police force declares that they "have generally all the powers 
and privileges and they are liable to all the duties and responsibilities that 
belong to constables" This is a legislative recognition of the fact that 
while constables have certain duties imposed upon them by statute they 
are in addition subject to the traditional duties of police officers of which 
coe'nizance is taken under the common law 
The respondent police officers were under a statutory duty to 
maintain a traffic patrol of the highway in question. The word "patrol" is 
used in reference to police passing along or over highways or streets in the 
performance of their duties. The word is sometimes used to refer to duties 
91. (1973), 30D.L.R. (3d) 641 (C.A.); ;aried (1975), 55 D.L.R. (3d) 96 (S.C.C.). 
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assigned to soldiers in reference to a camp, or to the duties of a caretaker 
of large buildings to protect the property against fire and burglary. There 
is a definite purpose in requiring the police to patrol the highways under 
their jurisdiction, namely, to ensure that traffic laws will be obeyed, to 
investigate road accidents, and to assist injured persons. All this is directed 
to the prevention of accidents and the preservation of the safety of road 
users. If an unlighted truck or other large obstruction presenting a danger 
to traffic were on a highway after nightfall any traffic officer, sensible of 
his duty, would feel obligated to adopt reasonable means of ensuring that 
adequate warning was given of their presence on the highway. A cavity 
such as existed here would be even less visible to a road user, and clearly 
presented a much greater hazard than an obstruction located above the 
road surface. 
Negligence as commonly defined includes both acts and omissions 
which involve an unreasonable risk of injury. In earlier times the common 
law furnished redress only for injury resulting from affirmative miscon-
duct, and inaction was regarded as too remote to furnish a ground for the 
imposition of legal liability. Much as the humanitarian spirit which 
motivated the conduct of the good Samaritan has been lauded, it was 
rooted in a moral philosophy, hence from the legal standpoint the laissez-
faire attitude of the priest and the Lévite was condoned. A member of a 
traffic detachment of the Ontario Provincial Police in the situation of 
Constable Boyd and Corporal Johnston is in an entirely different position 
from the ordinary citizen or the priest and the Lévite. These officers were 
under a positive duty by virtue of their office to take appropriate measures 
in the face of a hazardous condition such as they encountered here to warn 
approaching traffic of its presence... 
Looked upon superficially the passivity of these two officers in the 
face of the manifest dangers inherent in the inadequately guarded 
depression across the highway may appear to be nothing more than non-
feasance, but in the case of public servants subject not to a mere social 
obligation, but to what I feel bound to regard as a legal obligation, it was 
non-feasance amounting to misfeasance. Traffic officers are subject to all 
the duties and responsibilities belonging to constables. The duties which I 
would lay upon them stem not only from the relevant statutes to which 
reference has been made, but from the common law, which recognizes the 
existence of a broad conventional or customary duty in the established 
constabulary as an arm of the State to protect the life, limb and property 
of the subject... 
... Each case must, in the final analysis, depend upon its own 
peculiar circumstances, but to hold that the proven neglect attributed by 
the learned judge to both defendant police officers in the most emphatic 
terms was not an actionable wrong which attracted liability to the plaintiff 
in the degrees apportioned by the learned judge would be to make the 
phrase "police protection" hollow and meaningless. 
The Supreme Court of Canada affirmed, although it excused one 
of the several police officers involved. Mr. Justice Spence quoted at 
length from Mr. Justice Schroeder's opinion, which he described as 
"forthright and enlightened" and concluded: 
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I have the same view as to the duty of a police officer under the provisions 
of the said s. 3(3) of the Police Act in carrying out police traffic patrol. In 
my opinion, it is of the essence of that patrol that the officer attempt to 
make the road safe for traffic. Certainly, therefore, there should be 
included in that duty the proper notification of possible road users of a 
danger arising from a previous accident and creating an unreasonable risk 
of harm. 
In a dissenting opinion, Martland J., Judson and Pigeon JJ. 
concurring, stated that he found nothing in the legislation that would 
"indicate an intention on the part of the Legislature to impose a 
liability upon a member of that Force who fails to carry out a duty 
assigned to him under the statute". 
In The Queen v. Cote et a/.,92 Mr. Justice Galligan, at trial, held 
the provincial police partly to blame for a car accident because they 
failed to notify the Department of Highways about a dangerous icy 
condition on a highway. He stated : 
[T]here is a basic and fundamental duty on the part of the police officer to 
observe and report dangerous conditions seen by him on his patrol... 
In my opinion, [the police officer] was negligent in both his 
observation and report. He was negligent in my opinion in failing to 
recognize on his earlier visit to the scene that the situation was dangerous 
and a great hazard to motorists. He was negligent in the report he gave to 
the Department of Highways by not impressing upon them that the 
situation was one of extreme danger and of emergency. In my opinion, on 
the balance of probabilities this negligence was a contributing factor to the 
loss and damage in this case. 
On appeal, the Court of Appeal did not pass upon the duty of the 
police, but reversed the holding of liability against the police, on the 
ground that there was no causal connection between their failure to 
notify and the accident that occurred. In other words, even if they had 
warned the Department of Highways, it would have made no 
difference in preventing the accident. 
As for the liability of the Minister of Highways, the trial judge 
had held them and the police 75 percent at fault. The Court of Appeal 
affirmed, but the Supreme Court of Canada reduced their liability to 
25 percent, the defendant driver bearing 75 percent of the blame. The 
Supreme Court of Canada relied upon the provisions of the Highway 
Improvement Act.93 Mr. Justice Dickson warned, however, that the 
decision "does not import recognition of any general duty to salt or 
sand highways, failure in the discharge of which would expose the 
92. [1971] 2 O.R. 155. varied [1972] 3 O.R. 224 (C.A.), varied (1975), 51 D.L.R. (3d) 244 
(S.C.C.). 
93. Now R.S.O. 1970, c. 201, s. 30. 
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Minister to civil claims", but was limited to the extremely dangerous 
conditions at that particular location, which the trial judge had 
described as a "killer strip", about which the Department should have 
known. 
The obligation of police officers, therefore, has been enlarged 
considerably to protect the public as well as to avoid injuring or 
imprisoning them. It may well be that, one of these days, a Canadian 
crime victim will sue his police department for failing to take adequate 
steps to protect him from criminal conduct, as was done in a recent 
New York decision.94 It would make a fascinating law suit. 
2. Liability In Negligence of Governmental Officials 
The expansion of governmental activity has led to more and 
more public servants interfering more and more in people's lives. 
Although once immune from liability, governments have gradually 
allowed themselves to be held civilly responsible for their wrongful 
acts, despite some lingering procedural problems.1'5 Since the public 
system of control over these employees (training, discipline, firing, 
etc.) has proved somewhat imperfect, tort law has been used as one 
method of combatting some of the misconduct of certain public 
officials. Tort law has recognized that ordinary citizens rely for 
protection and advice on government employees, and that they are 
entitles to competent service. 
There has been a flurry of recent cases holding certain govern-
mental officials liable for their negligent conduct. Government 
inspectors, for example, must perform their inspections carefully or 
risk tort liability for any damage they cause. Thus, in Ostash v. 
Sonnenberg,9* a provincial gga inspector ((nd his employer, the 
Crown) was held partially responsible for the death of someone from 
carbon monoxide poisoning, which he helped to cause by failing to 
inspect a chimney properly, as required by provincial legislation. 
Similarly a municipal inspector, who failed to detect a defect in a 
water-valve box, was held liable for a flood this caused years later.97 In 
94. See Riss v. New York (1968), 240 N.E. .2d) 860, no liability. 
95. Goldenberg, "Tort Actions Against the Crown in Ontario", Special Lectures on New 
Developments in the Lawof Torts, ,973; Slutsky, "The Liability yo Public Authorities foo 
Negligence: Recent Canadian Developments", (1973) 36 Mod. L. Rev. 656. 
96. (1968),67D.L.R.(2d)311. 
97. Armstrong v. City of Regina, ,[922] } W.W.R. 685 (Sask. Q.B.). 
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the well-known decision of Dutton v. Bognor Regis U.D.C.?* lialility 
was also imposed on a municipal inspector (as well as others) for 
failing to detect an old rubbish tip under the foundation of a house, 
which neglect caused loss to a subsequent purchaser, when the house 
subsided. 
One attempt to impose liability on a government inspector failed 
on appeal, although it had been successfully utilized at trial. In McRae 
v. White Rock " the B.C. Court of Appeal held that there was no duty 
owed by the inspector, as a result of a by-law authorising the 
inspection of certain buildings, unless the inspector was notified that 
he was required to do so ; because he received no notification in this 
instance he, therefore, was under no obligation to inspect. It would 
undoubtedly have been otherwise, however, if the notification had in 
fact been given. 
Certain governmental employees who exercise custodial func-
tions have rendered their public employers civilly liable. Perhaps the 
best-known case is Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co.,100 where the 
House of Lords held that the Home Office could be held liable for the 
negligence of its employees in supervising some Borstal boys, who 
escaped from an island on a yacht and damaged the plaintiffs boat. 
Similarly, inmates of Canadian penitentiaries have been awarded 
damages against the Crown for the negligence of a prison doctorl01 
and for the negligence of some guards who required prisoners to work 
under dangerous conditions, leading to injury.102 
If there is no negligence, however, no liability will be attached,103 
as where a prisoner was stabbed by another prisoner when there was 
no reasonable anticipation of this happening,104 or where a prisoner 
fell from a truck after being hit by another prisoner.105 
The provincial Crown has also been held responsible for its 
negligent supervision of a deaf-mute student at a school for the deaf, 
98. [1972] 1 All E.R. 462. 
99. (1975), 56 D.L.R. (3d) 525, reversing (1973), 1 W.W.R. 514 (Berger J.). 
100. [1970] 2 All E.R. 294. 
101. Daoust v. The Quuen, [19696 2 Ex. C.R. 1.12 
102. Danard v. The Queen, [1971] F.F. 417 : prisoner hurt by power mower while cutting grass 
on hill ; MacLean vv The Queen, [1973] S.C.R. 2, at at 6, (1972), 27 D.L.R. (3d) 365, at p. 
368 (S.C.C.) : bale of straw knocked prisoner to ground, crippling him. 
103. See Ellis v. Home Office, [1953] 2 AH E.E. 149, at p. 154, no liability. 
104. Howley v. The Queen, [,973] F.F.C. 184. 
105. Timm v. The Queen, [1965] 1 Ex. C.R. 174, at p. 178 ; cf. Sturdy v. The Queen (1975)( 47 
D.L.R. (3d) 71 (Fed. Ct.): no liability for bear attack on visitor to national park. 
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when his hand was injured by an unguarded power saw.106 A mental 
hospital has been held to owe a duty to supervise its patients carefully 
to prevent them from attacking and injuring other patients.1"1 
Although, in this case, the defendant was not strictly a governmental 
agency, there is every reason to believe that this decision would extend 
to cover government-operated mental hospitals. 
Government employees involved in serving the public in a variety 
of other tasks are required to do so with reasonable care. One example 
of such a case is Grossman v. The King,10* where the maintenance 
foreman of an airport negligently failed to place warning flags around 
a ditch on the runway. This caused an airplane to be destroyed and a 
passenger to be injured. It was held that a duty was owed by the 
employee not only to his employer, the Crown, but also to pilots, who 
"were entitled to rely" on him to properly discharge his duty. In 
Hendricks v. The Queen,109 the Crown was held 50 percent to blame 
for a boating accident, in which the wife of the suppliant drowned as a 
result, in part, of the negligent failure of the servants of the Crown to 
replace a sign which warned about a waterfall, after it had been 
knocked over. Mr. Justice Spence felt that the Crown had not merely 
failed to warn, but had actually created the danger to navigation by 
the dam obstruction they had built below the water level. 
A recent case, The Queen v. Nord-Deutsche et o/..110 went even 
further than this in imposing liability on the Crown for a maritime 
collision between two ships. The Crown employees had negligently 
permitted a set of range lights, upon which a ship's pilot relied, to 
become displaced. Noel J., at trial,"1 had based the liability of the 
Crown on the ground that the Department had "engendered reliance 
on the guidance afforded by [the lights]", and, therefore, was required 
to use care in seeing that they remained in good working order or to 
give warning if they were not. In the Supreme Court of Canada, Mr. 
Justice Ritchie divided liability between the Crown and both ships and 
stated that there was a "breach of duty on the part of the servants of 
the Crown responsible for the care and maintenance of the range 
106. Dziwenka v. The Quuen, [1972] S.C.R. 419 ; ses also Thornton v. Board of School Trustees 
(1976), 57 D.L.R. (3d) 438: liability, afTd CA., damages varied. 
107. Lawsonv. Wellesley Hospital (1976), 90.R. .2d)677(C.A.). 
108. [19521 1 S.C.R. 571, at p. 614, per Kelock J. Cf. The King vv Anthony, [1946] S.S.R. 569: 
no liability for military activity of firing tracer bullets that caused fire since neglect of 
military duty but not private one. 
109. [1970] S.C.R. 237. 
110. [1971] S.C.R. 849, at p. 863 ; cf. Cleveland-Cliffs v. /?., [,957] S.S.C. 810. 
111. [1969] 1 Ex. C.R. .117 at p. .96. 
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lights... upon which lights mariners were entitled to place reliance". 
This decision may well create a whole range of new liabilities of the 
Crown in situations where they commence activities upon which 
others rely."2 
a) Negligent Advice 
With the advent and expansion of Hedley, Byrne v. Heller,' 13 
governmental officials have also been held liable for giving negligent 
advice leading to economic loss. In Ministry of Housing v. Sharp,114 
for example, a local council was held liable for the negligence of one of 
its clerks in connection with his negligence in preparing a certificate 
during the search of a title at the council's Registry Office. A similar 
case is Windsor Motors v. Corporation of Powell River,115 where 
liability was found when a municipal licence inspector negligently 
informed the plaintiff that a certain location was suitable for an 
automobile dealership, when in fact the zoning regulations prohibited 
such a use. In reliance upon this advice, the plaintiff rented the land, 
was given a licence by the inspector and conducted the business 
profitably for a time, until the error was discovered and he was forced 
to move, causing him economic loss. Another surprisingly alike case is 
Gadutsis v. Milne et al.,"6 where liability was imposed against a 
municipality when it negligently issued a building permit, which was 
later revoked, to someone who began to build in reliance upon it. Mr. 
Justice Parker explained : 
... the employees in the zoning department of the municipality were there 
to give out information as to zoning. [They] must have known that persons 
inquiring would place reliance upon what they said. [The employee] gave 
out incorrect information in the course of employment directly to the 
person seeking information. Under these circumstances I find that the 
municipality owed a duty of care... that it failed to discharge such duty and 
that as a consequence, the plaintiffs suffered loss. 
Similarly, in Couture v. The Queen,"11 it was decided that if a 
C.R.T.C. officer's negligence leads a person to believe that he has a 
112. Cf. Soukbyv. City ofToronto (1907), ,50.L.R. .13 :n liability yf railway crossing guard; 
O'Donnelllv The Queen, [1972] F.C.C. 9696 no niability of Department of Transport for 
certificate of airworthiness, but no cause proven. 
113. [1964] A.C. 465. 
114. [1970] 1 Al1 E.R. 1009. 
115. (1969), 68 W.W.R. 173(B.C.C.A.). 
116. [1973J2O.R.503. 
117. (1972), 28 D.L.R. (3d) 301 (Fed. Ct.)) 
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licence, when in fact he does not, and he relies on this to his detriment, 
liability may be found."8 Liability may also be imposed on a Hydro-
Electric Power Commission if they negligently estimate the cost of 
heating a swimming pool, but not if they are careful."9 
Health authorities may also attract liability if they fail to exercise 
their powers cautiously. In Collins v. Haliburton, Kawartha Pine 
Ridge District Health Unit,120 the defendant authority, after receiving 
written complaints from his neighbours, notified the plaintiff that his 
business operations, which he had been carrying on for over a year — 
namely the freezing, storing, processing and packaging of poultry offal 
for mink ranchers — constituted an offensive trade under the Public 
Health Act of Ontario and that it must be carried out elsewhere. This 
notice, which became known to everyone in the area, caused the ruin 
of the plaintiffs business. The defendant was found to be negligent in 
giving the notice, which he should have known would become public 
knowledge, without making a proper investigation and inspection, and 
without giving the plaintiff an opportunity to put forward his position. 
Mr. Justice Donoghue declared : 
Now if in Donoghue v. Stevenson the manufacturer of a bottled soft drink 
owed a duty of care to the purchaser of such drink from a shop to guard 
such purchaser from noxious material in the drink, it seems to me that the 
defendant here owed a duty of care to the plaintiff. If it should be said that 
the defendant here is a public body carrying out specific assigned duties 
and therefore is not liable for negligence which damaged the plaintiff, I 
would reply that this distinction was not made in the Dutton v. Bognor 
case... 
This action was later dismissed because the limitation period had 
elapsed.12I 
b) Limitation to Business Powers 
There are limitations on the ability of tort law to regulate the 
conduct of governmental agencies. An insignt into the boundary-line 
was provided in Welbridge Holdings Ltd. v. Metropolitan Corpora-
tion of Greater Winnipeg.122 A municipality paased a by--aw upon 
118. See[1972]F.C. 1137: leave to amend granted. 
119. Hodgins v. Hydro Electric, ,1972] ] O.R. .32, rev'd, duty, but tn oegligence e1976), ,1 
O.R. (2d) 713. 
120. (1972] 2 O.R. 508,26 D.L.R. (3d) 73. 
121. See Collins v. Hallburton, Kawartha Pine Ridge Distrist Health Unit (N° t), [1972] 3 O.R. 
643 (Donoghue J.). 
122. (1972), 22 D.L.R. (3d)470(S.C.C). 
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which a builder relied and spent money to prepare plans for an 
apartment building. When the by-law was declared invalid after an 
attack by some rate-payers, the builder had to abandon his plans, with 
consequent financial loss. The builder's action against the municipa-
lity, on the ground that its loss was suffered as a result of the negligent 
passage of the by-law, was ultimately dismissed. Mr. Justice Laskin 
observed that a municipality could incur liability both in contract and 
in tort during its exercise of "administrative or ministerial, or perhaps 
better categorized as business powers".123 However, where a munici-
pality errs while exercising its "legislative capacity" or its "quasi-
judicial duty", it is immune from civil liability, even though it acts 
improperly, in the same way as is a provincial legislature or the 
Parliament of Canada. No duty of care is owed in such circumstances. 
The function of negligence law is, thus, to be limited primarily to 
the review of lesser officials and the way in which they conduct 
ordinary business. It will have little impact upon the discretionary or 
quasi-judicial functions of the more senior civil servants, who will 
remain subject to other remedies. In support of this view, Mr. Justice 
Laskin suggested that "the risk of loss from the exercise of legislative 
and adjudicative authority is a general public risk and not one for 
which compensation can be supported on the basis of a private duty of 
care. The situation is different where a claim for damages for 
negligence is based on acts done in pursuance or in implementation of 
legislation or of adjudicative decrees." ,24 Although such a distinction 
unquestionably reduces the potential power and scope of negligence 
suits against public officials, this may be necessary for the smooth 
functioning of the bureaucracy. 
3. Abuse of Governmental Power 
Although beyond the reach of negligence law, perhaps, senior 
public officials are not totally beyond control by private law actions. If 
senior officials, including even Ministers of the Crown, deliberately 
abuse their power, and thereby cause loss to citizens, they may be 
answerable in damages. Of course, there are many other ways of 
checking such abuses of governmental power, but a tort action serves 
as one possible method of combating such conduct. It may not always 
be effective as a remedy, but it can spotlight the impugned conduct, so 
that the public can be made aware of the allegations made and the 
response offered. 
123. Ibid., at p. 477. 
124. Ibid., at pp. 478-479. 
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Perhaps the most celebrated case, in this area, is Roncarelli v. 
Duplessis.'2* The plaintiff, the proprietor of a restaurant, had a llcence 
to sell intoxicating liquor. The defendant, who was the Premier of 
Quebec at the time, caused his licence to be revoked in order to punish 
him because he was a member of and frequently assisted the Witnesses 
of Jehovah by arranging bail for them. The Supreme Court of 
Canada majority held that damages could be awarded against Premier 
Duplessis, because the cancellation of the licence was caused as a 
result of his unauthorised direction. The court indicated that a public 
officer "is responsible for acts done by him without legal justification". 
Although there is some reliance on Article 1053 of the Civil Code, the 
Judges treated the principle as though it was also part of the common 
law. Mr. Justice Rand indicated that something more than just the 
unlawful exercise of a discretion, something called "malice", was 
required before liability would be imposed: 
Malice in the proper sense is simply acting for a reason and purpose 
knowingly foreign to the administration, to which we have added here the 
element of intentional punishment by what was virtually vocation 
outlawry. 
Public officials, consequently, have a wide latitude in which to exercise 
their legitimate decision-making power, but they are not totally 
insulated from review by private action. 
Another well-known case is Farrington v. Thompson,'26 where 
some police officers, purporting to exercise their power under the 
Licensing Act, which provided that conviction of a third offence would 
render a licence forfeited, required the plaintiff to close down his hotel. 
There was no third conviction, according to the Judge, and the jury 
found that the defendants failed to exercise due care in ascertaining 
whether a third conviction had been obtained. The court found, 
nevertheless, that the defendants were liable for "misfeasance in a 
public office". Mr. Justice Smith said that "if some other public officer 
does an act, which, to his knowledge, amounts to an abuse of his office, 
and thereby causes damage to another person, then an action in tort 
for misfeasance in a public office will lie".127 There was apparently 
sufficient knowledge of lack of jurisdiction to satisfy the court that 
liability was called for. 
125. [1959] S.C.R. 121. 
126. [1959] V.R. 286. 
127. Ibid., at p. 293. See also Molot, "Tort Remedies Against Administrative Tribunals for 
Economic Loss", Law Society of Upper Canada, Special Lectures on New Developments 
in the Law of Torts, 1973, at p. 425. 
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If it is a mere error in the exercise of discretion, without any 
intention to do any harm, however, it seems as though no liability will 
be imposed. In Harris v. Law Society of Alberta,n2S the Benchers of 
the Law Society of Alberta used incorrect procedures, in violation of 
their statute, to disbar a lawyer. The court held that the Benchers had 
no power to make the order in question, which was thereby rendered 
null and void. Despite this, it dismissed the action for damages, 
because the order that the Benchers made was done "in what they 
bona fide believed to be the exercise of a judicial discretion" and which 
"happened, without their actual knowledge, to lack authority and 
validity". The facts of Harris, therefore, are in distinct contrast with 
the Roncarelii decision, where the defendant possessed both the 
knowledge of wrongdoing and the desire to inflict injury on the 
plaintiff. 
There is some recent authority that appears to have relaxed the 
requirement of malice or intentional wrongdoing. In McGillivray v. 
Kimber,299 a pilot, licenced at Sydney, Nova Scotia, under the 
Shipping Act, was dismissed from the service by the Sydney Pilotage 
Authority before his licence expired. Although the minority of the 
court felt that malice had to be proven for liability for a quasi-judicial 
act, the majority decided that the Authority was responsible. It had 
failed to abide by the statutorily required procedures of giving the 
plaintiff notice and an opportunity to be heard. Mr. Justice Anglin 
stated: "They committed an unwarranted and illegal act which 
subjected them to liability to the plaintiff for such damages as he 
sustained as a natural and direct consequence thereof." Mr. Justice 
Idington observed that "the respondents were acting entirely without 
jurisdiction and so acting must be held liable". 
The Courts of Quebec have been most diligent in this area. In 
Lapointe v. Le Roi,130 the petitioner, who was holder of a fishing 
licence, had it revoked by the Minister who lacked the statutory power 
to do so. The court ordered the Minister to compensate the petitioner 
for his loss. Another case is Leroux v. The City ofLachine,'il where a 
licence permitted the plaintiff to operate a dance hall. The city revoked 
the licence, without permitting him an opportunity to be heard. The 
court awarded damages on the ground that this was an "unwarranted 
and negligent action" on the defendant's part, amounting to an abuse 
of rights. 
128. [1936] S.C.R. 88. 
129. (1950), 52 S.C.R. 146. 
130. (1924), 87 B.R. 170. 
131. [1942] C.S. 352. 
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These cases are just a few of many that require governmental 
officials to exercise their power, at the least, honestly and in good 
faith, and at the most, legally and carefully. Wide latitude should be 
permitted to governmental officials in the legitimate conduct of their 
activity, but the courts seem to be moving toward holding them liable 
in much the same way as other professionals.132 
a) Three Recent Challenges to Government 
Three recent cases dramatize the capacity of tort law to assist 
citizens in challenging governmental decisions in the law courts. Even 
if such lawsuits are unsuccessfull, they still provide a forum whereby 
citizens, who are unhappy with governmental decisions, may ventilate 
their grievances. 
A successful challenge of governmental conduct was made in 
Central Canada Potash Co. Ltd. v. Attorney General for raskatche-
wan,'" where Mr. Justice Disbery imposed liability against the 
Saskatchewan government for $1 500000. The plaintiff company was 
in the mining business in Saskatchewan, and had an agreement to 
supply potash to its United States based shareholder. As a result of 
over-production of potash and a drastic drop in world prices, the 
potash industry in New Mexico, which had been the major producer in 
the past, became depressed. A deal was made between the Govern-
ment of Saskatchewan and the Government of New Mexico to control 
the production and sale of potash. Under the scheme, each producer in 
Saskatchewan was allowed under a licence from the Minister, to sell a 
certain amount of potash. The object was to limit the supply of potash 
in world markets and to control its price. The scheme was changed to 
some extent in 1971 to control, through an export association, all 
exports of potash. 
The plaintiff company objected to this scheme on the ground that 
it interfered with its contractual obligations with its United States 
based shareholder. An application for a licence permitting it to 
comply with its contract was refused, and the Deputy Miniter, by 
letter to the plaintiff company, threatened to cancel its existing licence 
because it was exceeding its quota in order to meet its contractual 
obligations. The plaintiff company yielded to the threat and, there-
upon, commenced this action for declarations that the regulations 
132. See, generally: R. J. Gray, "Private Wrongs of Public Servants", (1959) 47 Calif. L. Rev. 
303; Rubinstein, "Liability in Tort of Judicial Officers", (1964) 15 V.T.LJ. 2117 
133. (1975), 57D.L.R.(3d)7. 
870 Les Cahiers de Droit (1976) )1 7. de D. 831 
passed under the Act were ultra vires the provincial legislature, and 
that all action pursuant to them were null and void. In addition, the 
plaintiff sought damages for intimidation. 
The Trial Judge declared the marketing scheme ultra vires and 
awarded $1 500000 damages for the tort of intimidation against the 
Government of Saskatchewan. During the course of his lengthy 
judgment, which is now under appeal, he remarked : 
It is quite clear from the cases that the threat complained of must be a 
threat to do an act which is in itself illegal. So to make a coercive threat to 
sue on an overdue promissory note or to disinherit a child of the 
intimidator would not be actionable because the intimidator has the legal 
right to sue or to disinherit. On the other hand where a debtor threatened 
his creditor that he would pay no part of his debt unless the creditor 
accepted a lesser sum in full satisfaction, such threat was illegal : 
The Courts are always open to do justice according to the law as 
given to them by the people's representatives in Parliament and the 
Legislatures. The Courts have always been opposed to persons seeking "to 
do their own justice" in whatever way they themselves desire to adopt. The 
cult of the heaviest clout, which is too often seen in the world today, is, of 
course, the very antithesis of the rule of law. 
It is, thus, clear that governments in future will have to exercise more 
restraint in the conduct of their affairs, or else expose themselves to 
multi-million dollar litigation, as well as the attendant negative 
publicity resulting therefrom. 
A case in which the government decision was unsuccessfully 
attacked is Berryland Canning Co. Ltd. v. The Queen,uu where a 
canning company sued the Government of Canada because of its 
decision to ban the sale of cyclamates under its Food and Drugs Act 
powers. It was alleged that this was negligently done and that it was 
ultra vires. The court concluded that the regulations were intra vires 
the Governor-in-Council and that there was no proof of negligence by 
the government. In a dictum, the Court indicated that, even if 
illegality had been proven, there would be no responsibility on the 
principle of Welbridge Holdings. Further, the Court concluded that 
the officials of the Food and Drug Directorate acted 
prudently, expeditiously and reasonably in the public interest. To have 
acted otherwise, in the circumstances herein related, might well have 
exposed them to a charge of negligence or breach of duty. In addition to 
the United States and Canada, some thirty other countries have likewise 
announced a ban on cyclamates as a food additive. Accordingly, I have no 
hesitation in rejecting the plaintiffs allegations of impropriety in the 
actions of the Food and Drug Directorate. 
134. (1974), 44 D.L.R. (3d) 568 (Federal Ct., Heald J.). 
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Another case in which a decision of Cabinet officers was 
challenged, without success, is Roman Corporation Ltd. v. Hudsons 
Bay Oil & Gas Company et a/.,135 where the Supreme Court of 
Canada dismissed, on the pleadings, an action against Ministers of the 
Crown for announcing that they would not permit the sale of the 
plaintiffs interests in a uranium mine to a company controlled by non-
Canadians. An agreement had been made between the plaintiff and a 
buyer but, upon hearing of this agreement, the Prime Minister and the 
Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources of Canada made statements 
in the House of Commons, which they confirmed by telegram, that the 
Government would prohibit this sale and enact legislation'for that 
purpose, if it was necessary to do so. As a result of these statements by 
the Cabinet Ministers, the sale did not go through. 
The appellants brought an action in damages for procuring 
breach of contract, conspiracy, intimidation and unlawful interference 
with the economic interests of the plaintiff. The respondents moved to 
strike out the statement of claim as disclosing no cause of action. The 
statement of claim was struck out ; this was affirmed on appeal and 
further affirmed by the Supreme Court of Canada. 
The Supreme Court held that these statements were made in good 
faith, as representative of the policy of the Government of Canada 
with respect to this important matter of public concern and, therefore, 
there was no attempt to induce a breach of contract in these 
circumstances. The appellant could not secure damages for intimida-
tion either, because the government did not threaten any unlawful act, 
which is a requirement of that tort. It indicated only that it would 
enact appropriate legislation, if necessary, in the public interest, which 
is certainly not an unlawful act. In addition, because, there was no 
desire to harm the plaintiffs, damages for conspiracy were not 
available either. Consequently, the statement of claim was struck out. 
Thus, although the plaintiffs were unsuccessful in the latter two 
actions, they at least had the opportunity to challenge the decisions of 
government at the highest level and to expose its method of 
investigation and decision-making in public. This is a valuable exercise 
in a democratic society, because it makes the public more aware of the 
way in which governments make decisions. Further, it renders 
governmental officials more attentive to the public consequences of 
their decisions, because they may have to justify them under oath in 
court. 
135. (1973),36D.L.R.(3d)413. 
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V 
Conclusion : Peaceful Coexistence 
As in all things, there is an ebb and flow to public and private law. 
When private law falters, and fails to respond adequately to social 
needs, it is taken over by public law. Similarly, when public law 
appears unresponsive to human aspirations, it will be challenged by 
private law. I believe that this is as it should be. It is not necessary for 
one regime to achieve predominance over the other. Rather, we should 
seek a healthy balance between the two, a form of peaceful coexis-
tence, where public and private law may compete in the quality of 
service they provide to the people they are supposed to serve. 
If public law moves in to take control over some area of social 
interaction that is fine. The full power of the state, through the police 
or an administrative agency, can be brought to bear on wrongdoers. 
The full range of penal sanctions will be available to the Judge or 
board before whom the complaint is heard. This method of proceeding 
is usually expeditious and inexpensive for the aggrieved person. 
However, the complainant's influence over the process is limited, he is 
generally unable to secure compensation, and the sanctions adminis-
tered can be tough on the accused. 
If public law institutions are felt to be unresponsive, an aggrieved 
citizen can take up the challenge in a private suit and become a 
crusader, an ombudsman, a one-person lobby. Only civil sanctions 
will be available to the Court before which the dispute is heard, but, 
added to the bad publicity that can be directed against the defendant, 
this can be formidable enough. It may certainly be more expensive 
for the plaintiff to proceed this way, but, if he does, he has more 
control over the proceedings, he may recover some compensation 
(including substantial reimbursement for his legal costs), and the 
result may be less harsh on the defendant. 
In conclusion, I believe that Canadian society would be better 
served by less public law and less government and by more private law 
and more tort suits. Rather than eliminating tort remedies, we should 
strengthen them. Tort law should not be allowed to die, but it should 
be given a blood transfusion. Let us enlarge the role of legal aid in civil 
cases, let us unleash some consumer ombudsmen to serve individuals, 
let us expand the use of contingency fees, let us permit more class 
actions, and let us broaden the availability of punitive damage awards. 
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These measures would make private law suits more attractive and 
economically feasible. These reforms would also help us to achieve a 
healthier balance between public and private law, between ordinary 
citizens and other powerful citizens, and between all individuals and 
their governments. 
